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The Politics of Environmentalism in Modern Day China
William Labate
concerns both before and after they emerge. Some
of these prescriptions are unlikely to be
implemented at the present time, but can be
pursued in the long run while still maintaining
China’s current style of government.
In China, environmental activism must be
carefully constructed to fit into the Chinese
government structure to avoid being rebuked. The
Chinese government is dominated, of course, by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which operates
party cells at every single level of government. The
central communist party bureau sets economic,
political, and social guidelines for the rest of the
country to follow. To a limited extent, the central
party sets environmental policy as well for issues of
national concern like carbon intensity, certain
standards, reforestation, etc. Still, many
environmental problems are of a regional and local
nature and are solved locally which we will see
with our case studies (with the last being an
exception). What this paper also looks at is how
the PRC is not a monolithic one-party state with
directives coming from the top and reaching the
bottom in the same form. Every regional and even
local party branch has different styles and priorities
as will be seen in this paper. A directive from a
higher level of government doesn’t always get
implemented the way it is intended. The lower level
of government might want to tailor it to further
their own priorities or ignore it all together if it
contradicts their goals. This kind of internal dissent
cannot be tolerated for issues of high priority, but
for low priority issues it is permitted.
Environmental issues are of a relatively low
priority compared to issues like economics or
security. When George Bush asked Hu Jintao what
kept him awake at night and he replied, the worry
of “creating 25 million new jobs a year.”1 If it
means ignoring the protection of the environment
in order to prevent the creation of millions of
jobless youth, the Chinese government will do so.
Yet, meeting these economic targets have been, and
will be the highest priority in China for a while.
Creating these jobs will be worth the environmental
externalities because the CCP judges
unemployment as the most dangerous issue.
Despite this, there has been a general backlash from

Introduction
Over the past few decades the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) has experienced
breathtaking growth and development. Millions of
Chinese have risen out of poverty while China has
experienced one of the largest rural to urban
migrations in history. Most economists predict that
China’s growth will outpace even the dynamic
United States economy. There is, however, a
tradeoff for all of this growth, urbanization, and
modernization within China. A byproduct of this
prosperity has been the destruction of China’s
environment for the sake of continued economic
growth. The most obvious issue is that China is the
largest emitter of greenhouse gasses in the world,
which of course contributes to global warming.
While greenhouse gas emissions are not a
contentious issue for the average Chinese citizen,
there are many issues which are, ranging from large
scale air pollution to local land confiscations. The
focus of this paper are these underlying
environmental issues which have large implications
for individuals and civil society. Because these
issues are so prevalent, individuals and groups seek
to remedy them through environmental activism. In
any democratic country this activism would take
the shape of active NGOs and individuals lobbying
their government to implement effective
environmental policies. By the nature of China’s
political system, this activism takes quite a different
shape.
The objective of this paper is to examine the
limits of environmental activism set by the
government and how Chinese civil society attempts
to operate within those guidelines. The paper wants
to show that the PRC does not operate with a rigid,
top down structure, and that there are in fact many
variations in priorities, actions and outcomes
between the different levels of the Chinese
government. It examines the barriers that activists
encounter and the most successful methods that
they employ to overcome them. Using these
methods this paper suggests several ways that
activists might want to employ in order to be
successful in the future. Since China is not an ideal
place for environmental activists, this paper also
attempts to offer several policy prescriptions for the
PRC to better address environmental and other
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the Chinese citizenry for not having stricter
environmental standards. The national and regional
governments have attempted to placate these
demands by implementing stricter standards and
improving environmental quality but only to a
limited extent. If China’s environment degrades in
a more rapid fashion, citizen displeasure might
move environmental issues to a higher priority.
Due to the nature of its political system, the
PRC and its citizens must reconcile how
environmental activists can operate in an
authoritarian, one-party state. The environmental
regulations that the CCP write are the law of the
state and are expected to be followed. By
challenging those laws or lack thereof,
environmental activists might be seen as opposing
the CCP and by extension, the state. Even by
framing activism as non-political concerning only
environmental issues, it is easy to see how that can
be extended to being considered a political issue as
well. Despite this, the PRC has loosened its grip on
civil society since the days of Mao. In the past few
decades, civil society and the press have been given
much more freedom to operate in many more areas
than before. Though there are still many restrictions
that the government places on communication and
the internet that restrict NGOs from organizing.
Additionally, in most places NGOs have to be preapproved in order to operate which severely
hampers the emergence of new NGOs around
various issue areas. If an issue is too controversial
or the government thinks that the organization will
pose a threat to its rule, the government does not
have to grant it recognition. This lack of legal status
gives the government an excuse to suppress their
activities if needed. It is still a challenge for NGOs
and individuals to pinpoint the boundaries that the
state sets forth for them in their activism. Where the
state puts these boundaries and the methods for
how civil society determines their location are what
the case studies in this paper examine in great
detail. I will explore these issues in the following
three case studies of environmental activism in
China.
The first case study examines the Green
Garden conflict in Shanghai during the 1990s. In
two instances, the local government wanted to build
a structure in the middle of the green area in the
Green Garden Village. According to the municipal
regulations, green area is supposed to be preserved
for the people of the village and not to be built up.
The residents of the village attempted to assert their
environmental rights by applying pressure to the
local and city governments as well as different

regulatory agencies to revoke the permit. The local
government, however, sought to prevent the
protesters from succeeding by manipulating
existing regulations. This case study reveals how a
local government interacts with an organized and
coordinated environmental protest movement who
uses their own laws against them. It also is intended
to reveal how far protesters can go before they go
outside the limits of non-political issues. In addition
to the government-protester interaction, there are
also several rule of law failures on the part of the
government and bureaucracies which are examined.
The use of journalists and print media also play a
role in channeling support for the movement.
Finally several policy prescriptions are issued to
encourage consistent applications of regulations
and clearer land laws.
The second case study moves to the municipal
level of government of Shanghai and the conflict
over the Jiangwan Marshlands. The government
wanted to drain the marsh and develop the area in
order to accommodate the fast growing city. There
were many Shanghai residents who did not want
the marshlands to disappear at all since they are a
vital green space which offers a prime place to bird
watch. The fight to preserve the marshlands was led
by an illegal and unregistered NGO, the Shanghai
branch of WWF. The residents, many of them who
were part of this NGO organized meetings and
petitions against the building. They primarily used
the internet as their chief medium of
communication to organize but due to their illegal
status, the government was able to step in and shut
them down. Ultimately their efforts failed with only
a small part of the marshland preserved and the rest
build on. This case study is intended to show how
the government handles dissent from illegal NGOs
at a larger level of government. It also highlights
how the internet can be used to organize protesters
and how the government responds to that medium.
Finally, it shows how the government out rightly
prioritizes economic growth over the preservation
of green space.
The third study is the dam project on the Nu
River in which a legal NGO, the Green
Environmental Volunteers (GEV), managed to
prevent this project from being constructed. The
study examines the favorable NGO climate in
Beijing and how NGOs can operate with a reduced
fear of persecution. Establishing bonds and
connections were crucial in the study since the
GEV was able to collaborate with NGOs from the
other side of the country to collect data and raise
public opinion. Another interesting factor was the
199
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fact that the Ministry of Environmental Protection
was on the side of the NGOs and assisted them in
the form of giving information. The fissures
between different parts of the central government
will be analyzed as well as effective strategies to
increase cooperation between NGOs.
Several factors went into the methodology of
selecting these three case studies. At the most
general, the cases were selected for their different
levels of analysis with the Green Garden village
being at the most local level, Jiangwan marshlands
at the municipal/regional level and the Nu River at
the regional/national level. It is necessary to see
how at all levels the government interacts with
environmental activism and how different priority
levels affect that interaction (i.e. issues of national
priority are more critical that regional/local). The
form of advocacy is also another critical factor into
determining the case studies. The Green Garden
case was driven primarily by a few motivated
individuals, the Jiangwan case with a loosely
organized illegal NGO, and the Nu River with
recognized and more organized NGOs. The rising
importance of the internet is also important to
examine with it playing a big role in the Jiangwan
study. Each study examines a difficult hurdle that
Chinese civil society has to overcome like rule of
law failures (Green Garden), NGO recognition and
internet censorship (Jiangwan), and NGO
collaboration (Nu River). Two were big successes
but another was a failure (Jiangwan) which is
significant because these protests do fail on many
occasions. What they all have in common is the
PRC putting economic issues ahead of
environmental ones. They all examine fissures and
divergent interests at the different levels showing
that the PRC is not a unitary actor both within and
between levels of government. Each case study
shows how the government attempts to clamp down
on activists and stifle their dissent with varying
results. Finally each one identifies the pitfalls that
activists have to avoid in order for them to be
effective in an authoritarian state.

Green Garden New Village in Shanghai was one
such initiative designed to resettle residents from
the city center to new residential communities
closer to the city’s periphery. Regulations
established when constructing these villages
mandated that 10.16 percent of the village’s land
area is comprised of green space. Green Garden
village was comprised of 12 apartment blocks with
a total of 10,000 residents surrounding and 8,000
square meter park. Residents were relocated from
their dwellings in their traditional neighborhoods,
or “lilong,” and moved to these new villages. Many
of the 12 housing blocks consisted of residents
from several different lilong but a several of the
blocks had been “collectively resettled” with
residents all from the same lilong.2
The individual villages of the Shanghai
municipality are composed of a series of different
divisions managing affairs at the most local level.
Theoretically, the most powerful citizen
organization is the Resident’s Committee
comprised of local residents which is supposed to
represent their interests to the local government. In
reality, the members of this organization also must
be members of the local cells of the CCP so they
largely represent the party’s interest instead. 3 The
Residents’ Committee, which is supposed to be
politically autonomous, is in actuality held
accountable to the Street Council which is the most
basic form of local governance. This is a good
example of how the CCP uses organizations which
are supposed to be representing citizen interests, to
represent their interests. With housing being
commercialized and many of the tasks of a landlord
moving from the responsibility of the government
to real-estate management companies, the city of
Shanghai decided to set up home-owners’
committees in 1997. These committees were
assigned one to each block and were designated to
handle concerns between residents and the realestate management company. The real estate
management companies, although seemingly
independent from government, exist to serve the
government’s interests and are extensions of their
power. It is a good example of China’s “Red
Capitalism,” or state direction of economic entities.
Beneath all of these organizations are informal
community associations of citizens who live in the

Case Study #1: Individual Activism in the
Shanghai Green Gardens
This first case study examines the conflict
between residents and the local government over
construction in the green space of the Green Garden
New Village in Shanghai. In an effort to address
environmental decay and degradation inside
Chinese cities, several municipalities embarked on
urban renewal campaigns during the 1990s. The

2
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area and have common interests, like the Elderly
Association. 4
The first major occurrence of green space
destruction in Green Garden came when a realestate developer obtained a permit to build a
structure in the middle of the village park in 1993.
After the construction began, it was discovered by a
group of elderly woman who spread the news
through their informal associations within the
community. They reported this violation to the
Residents’ Committee who then notified the Street
Council and the real-estate developer. The
residents, through their local associations, wrote a
series of complaint letters to the company which
were all ignored. At the time, the home owners’
committees had not been created so the residents
turned to another village resident named Shen Xin
who agreed to help them.
Shen carefully constructed an advocacy
strategy that was both effective in getting the
residents’ argument across and not getting him
arrested. He needed to carefully define a reason to
advocate for the protection of the green space that
did not appear to go against the party or the
government so their actions would not be
suppressed. Shen framed his complaints in order to
convey that residents were seeking to “protect their
environmental rights” according to the laws passed
by the government.5 To back up these rights, Shen
used an “authenticating strategy,” which meant that
he was not disagreeing with the official policy on
environmental issues; he was simply compelling
the government to adhere to their own laws. For
example, the Shanghai Green Administrative
Regulations explicitly say that “Building in public
green space is forbidden.”6 The issue in this case
was not that there was a lack in regulation
protecting the environment; it was that existing
regulations were not being enforced. Shen would
use these regulations when discussing issues with
officials and committees making it difficult for
them to contradict government laws. With the lack
of response from the Street Council, Shen took his
complaints to the local Bureau of Urban Planning
and the Bureau of Park Management who were
charged with protecting the environment.
Unfortunately for Shen, these two bureaus did not
want to confront the other branches of the local
government even though they supported his cause.
This is a perfect example of rule of law failure

since the bureaucracy should be acting according to
the law and not trying to interpret the wishes of the
party. Since local remedies were not producing the
desired outcome, Shen managed to convince the
residents to file a “collective complaint” to the
Shanghai municipal government.7 What he was
trying to do was draw attention to these abuses by
the local government and show that enough citizens
were displeased with this failure.
Shen decided to become bolder with his
struggle to preserve the park as the battle went into
its second year. Restrictions on the media had been
loosened during the past few decades on issues
which are not too politically sensitive in nature.
Shanghai’s newspapers began publishing stories on
the Green Garden conflict which eventually came
to the attention of many high municipal officials.
The vice-mayor issued a statement that the situation
should be handled “according to the law.”8 Though
this was not a direct order to end the project, the
Bureau of Park Management interpreted it as
enough of a justification to order a freeze of further
construction. Despite the freeze, the developer
continued to build on the site in secret but the
residents quickly discovered this violation. At this
point, Shen made his most risky gamble yet when
he ordered a few of the activists to break into the
construction site and take down all of the
scaffolding. When asked why he did such a thing,
Shen replied that “The government had already
forbidden the construction but they still went on, so
what they were doing was illegal. We rushed into
the site just to stop the illegal work. That’s why we
dared to do it.”9 By framing it in this way, Shen
was able to portray the struggle as the people
against the development company and not the
people against the government (even though they
were essentially the same entity). After this incident
as well as subsequent stories in the press, the
Bureau of Urban planning revoked the construction
permit and forced them to leave the park.
Even with their initial victory to preserve the
park, the residents of Green Garden had to fight for
their environmental rights once more in 1997, but
this time it was against the local government. The
original plans for the park included the opportunity
for the construction of a small, 135 square meter
community center for the elderly. Despite these
clear restrictions, the district government and the
Street Council wanted to build a 2,600 square meter
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center for “old cadres” who were part of the
movement which helped found the PRC. 10 Upset at
this seizure of park lands, the residents protested
that the park belonged to the community and were
protected by the state under the law. The district
government claimed that the park belonged to the
state and they had the right to do with it what they
wished. After the homeowners’ committee failed to
reach an agreement with the Street Council, they
once again turned to the media for support. After
hearing about the story in the news, the municipal
government put pressure on the district to
compromise with the residents. Both the Street
Council and the Homeowners’ Committee agreed
to the construction of a larger community center in
the park than what was detailed in the regulations,
but only at the size of 650 square meters and not for
cadres. The Street Council however, did not honor
the agreement and decided to build a center for the
cadres anyway at a size of 1,960 square meters.
After discovering that their agreement was
going to be disregarded, the residents were
outraged. Some wanted to take radical action and
destroy the construction site all together. This
might be seen as a direct attack on the local
government and a precursor to further violent
actions. Shen knew this would turn many of his
allies and the higher levels of government against
the movement so he took a different approach. He
led about 100 residents to the construction site to
negotiate with a government representative. When
nobody came to talk, Shen ordered the residents to
pull down the barrier wall around the site and do
nothing else. In a very precise and orderly manner
Shen hoped that the local government would be
“afraid of the resident’s potential ‘violence’” but
avoided any outward example of real violence. 11
Seeing this display, the Street Council temporarily
stopped construction only to continue soon after.
As the builders continued construction on the
expanded site, a few of the younger residents began
to circulate a petition to end it. The petition itself
wasn’t risky however, the residents wanted to
submit it to the municipal authorities around June
4th, a sensitive date because of the June 4th
movement in China during 1989 democracy
protests. Shen thought that this was too politically
risky and wanted to get the government’s attention
but “not let them lose face.”12 They submitted their
petition to the government office in the evening in

an attempt to avoid public attention. In this way,
the Shen and his followers wanted to not seem like
they were attempting to blatantly muster public
support in challenging the government. The Street
Council struck back and declared that a petition
around the period of June 4th was illegal. They
organized a public meeting with the Residents’
Council and retired members of the Communist
party where they declared that Shen and his
followers were acting out of selfish interests and
not of that of the community. The Street Council
even called the police to come and surround the
building which served to intimidate the residents.
Despite Shen’s efforts to “depoliticize the matter,
the Street Council consciously treated the conflict
as a political question.”13
This intimidation by the police created fissures
between the 12 homeowners associations and
threatened the entire movement. Those who lived in
the same lilong before they were moved showed the
most commitment to the cause demonstrating how
far old community ties went.14 Shen wanted to
press on with the strategy of depolarization even
after the Street Council tried to bribe him. He
decided to continue to go through legal route by
making repeated complaints to the Bureau of Park
Management and the Bureau of Urban Planning
about the illegal construction even though they
were still under pressure from the street council not
to act. He once again reached out to the media
where he portrayed the issue as an environmental
conflict and not as one against the government.
Through this channel, the wider public as well as
many municipal officials were made aware of the
Green Garden issue. Shen even went further to
bring a lawsuit against the development company
in order to compel them to follow the law. In this
way he hoped “to establish the rule of law instead
of the rule by administrative government.”15 By
focusing on the application of the law, Shen sought
to use that as his cover from being accused of
challenging the state. Shen claimed that the
residents “defend the law. We are the people, so we
stand on the side of the state. We know we are not
against the state, but are just protecting our
interests.”16 After facing all of this opposition and
pressure from above, the local government decided
to abandon the project.
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that these abuses were occurring which led to
pressure on the street council from above.
Petitioning against abuses of the law by the
government is actually encouraged by many leaders
in China. Just recently Prime Minister Wen Jiabao
appeared at the nation’s top petition bureau to, as
the New York Times describes it, compel “citizens
to criticize the government and press their cases for
justice” when laws are being violated.17 It should be
noted that the petition bureau is not intended to
make the government more liberal but instead make
it more efficient. This criticism would have never
been tolerated in the Maoist days of China where
any criticism of government would be seen as a
challenge to the state. Though today, it is still
doubtful that issues of real political or economic
importance would be accepted by the government.
It is easy to sweep away Wen’s statements as
political posing and rhetoric but for environmental
issues the petition bureau can assist residents to a
limited extent. Alone, the petitions that Shen
submitted against the building weren’t very
effective but combined with media assistance they
managed to accomplish his goals.
In both of the Green Garden conflicts the press
played a critical role in disseminating information
and for turning the people and municipal
government to the side of the protesters. Though
authoritarian, the PRC gives its press a certain
(albeit short) amount of leeway to operate and
report on stories. The media performs a certain
amount of “self-censorship” to avoid potential
“political minefields” while still being allowed to
report on somewhat sensitive topics.18 Most
politically sensitive issues are still off limits but
since environmental issues are of a relatively low
political importance, in both cases the media
decided to pick up the story. In both Green Gardens
cases a law, written by the CCP, was clearly being
violated and the residents had legitimate
grievances. Even in the case where the local
government was involved, these newspapers
circulated city-wide. By going against the paper,
the local government would attract unwanted
attention for its law-breaking from the public and
from the municipal government. While the media
cannot go against the party line it is usually
acceptable to expose government abuses at the
local level. This media publication was able to

Analysis and Policy Prescriptions
The Green Garden incidents highlight several
trends in how the government and citizens interact
over environmental discourse in China. First, the
citizens have a much larger amount of leeway to
protest environmental issues which are usually of
low political significance. In this particular case,
the construction of a senior center in the middle of
a village park does not have political significance
outside the local level. Shen’s more radical actions
like taking down the scaffolding and tearing down
the wall around the construction site would not be
tolerated if the issue in question was more
sensitive. It did help that the city government did
give tacit support for the goals of the protesters.
Though Shen’s goal was to depoliticize the
environmental issue in question, the July 4th
petition threatened to contradict that stance. Shen
was still able to avoid any uncomfortable
statements near the anniversary but the government
still tried to politicize the matter. This politicization
of non-political environmental issues was an
attempt by the street council to drag the issue into
the forbidden zone of political dissent. After failing
to effectively contradict Shen since his legal
argument was stacked against them, they attempted
to halt his protests from this approach. Shen was
able to drag the protest out of that zone and back
into that of non-political dissent. It was clear to
Shen that in China, discourse is only tolerated
within those limits of non-political dissent. Once it
strays outside those boundaries it can be interpreted
by the government at higher levels as a threat or
challenge to their rule. Shen accurately knew that
by talking about these issues in a non-political light
was the only way to do so without fear of
retribution. His success at bringing the issues back
into this light was the reason why it ultimately
succeeded and was not shut down by the police.
The second trend was that the use of official
channels and the media to effectively register
dissent. Shen consistently quoted government
regulations and the citizen’s environmental rights
as justification to halt the destruction of the green
space. By using the PRC regulations while talking
to officials, Shen placed them in a difficult position
since they would have to contradict laws written by
the party and government. This authenticating
strategy is useful since sometimes the laws for
proper environmental protection are in place but
they are simply not enforced properly. Shen also
used completely legitimate petitions and collective
complaints to alert the higher level of government

17

Barboza, David. “China Leader Encourages Criticism
of Government.”
18
Tong, Jingrong. “Press self-censorship in China: A
case study in the transformation of discourse,” 593.
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attract enough attention from the municipal
authorities that they in fact did apply pressure to the
local government to compromise with the
protesters. At the end of the first case after the Vice
Mayor saw the news stories about the issues he
even issued a veiled statement to support the
protesters argument. The media also exposed the
Bureau of Urban planning which after much
reporting withdrew its permit for the building
showing that the media has influence on the
bureaucracy as well. After Hu Jintao rose to the
post of CCP General Secretary in 2002, he wanted
to promote more transparency in government
through the media. It was Hu’s desire for
transparency that actually encouraged media to
“investigate allegations of corruption and
mismanagement of local affairs by local
officials.”19 Since these reforms took place after the
Green Garden protest, they can be seen as the
continuation of the expansion in the range that the
media can operate in China. By no means should
this be viewed as liberalization since the arena of
political reforms is still out of the questions. The
goal of these reforms is to make the government
more efficient and not necessarily to give the press
more freedoms. Though this means that now it is
even easier to report on environmental violations in
local government, the media is more constrained
when criticizing existing regulations or the lack
thereof. The media is always under the rather
ambiguous Article 51 of the Constitution of the
People’s Republic of China which states that “The
exercise by citizens of the People's Republic of
China of their freedoms and rights may not infringe
upon the interests of the state.”20 This is another
vaguely worded clause that the government can cite
when they want to limit the publication ability of
journalists. In order to improve governance overall
and encourage truly effective investigative
journalism the CCP needs to loosen its grip on the
press. If a particular project or program of vital
national interest has problems with corruption or
harms the environment, the media would be less
likely to cover it because of fear of retribution. The
media also might misjudge the “minefield” and
may not even cover some stories where their stories
might be totally in the bounds to report. Unless
changed, the way that journalism laws are in place
currently discourages the media from publishing

stories which might lead to better governance and
environmental protection in general. 21
The third trend that was prevalent was the use
by the local government of the ambiguous wording
of laws and ignoring regulations to try to get their
way. Ignoring regulations works in many instances
around China when the opposition is not as
organized or as cunning as Shen’s movement. This
rule of law problem can be abused in order to
ignore environmental issues for the sake of
progress and economic growth. China’s land laws
also open up more maneuverability since their
vague definition of land ownership allows for wide
interpretation. It is really up to the citizens to call
the government out on their abuses in order for the
problem to get fixed in many cases. In other
instances, the project may be of such national or
regional importance that no amount of protest will
convince the government otherwise since it can
many times fall back on legal ambiguity if no law
specifically forbids their actions.
Both incidents in the Green Garden case reveal
several weaknesses of the rule of law on the local
level in China which must be addressed in order to
avoid future protests. Pan Wei identifies 5 areas on
which he bases rule of law; a neutral civil service,
an autonomous judiciary, social consultative
institutions, and freedom of speech.22 The most
glaring failing of the rule of law in this first
scenario was the lack of a neutral civil service. The
local Bureau of Urban Planning and the Bureau of
Park Management were constantly trying to
interpret the will of the party rather than apply the
regulations that were clearly in place. In general,
this leads to arbitrary application of the law by the
local bureaucracies both to the advantage and
disadvantage of the municipal government. On one
side, the government is disadvantaged because the
regulations to preserve green space are being
ignored. The whole purpose of the Green Garden
village was to combat urban decay and lead to a
green renewal of Shanghai by promoting more
green space. When the local Street Council ignores
regulations, it harms the goals of the municipal
government and undermines their objectives. The
advantage to this weakness in rule of law for the
local (and municipal) government is that it can
ignore the regulations when it is in their interest to
do so. If an important structure needed to be built,

19
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People’s Republic of China.

22

Rawnsley p.125
Peerenboom, Randall. " A Government of Laws:
democracy, rule of law and administrative law reform
in the PRC," 47.

204
Published by KnightScholar, 2012

7

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2011 [2012], Art. 22

benefits, neutrality has faced many obstacles since
it is hard to enforce at the local levels and the CCP
enjoys its ability to selectively apply policy when it
suits them.
One of the several reasons that issues like
those in the Green Gardens case arise, is because of
the ambiguity of China’s land laws. The
government has many reasons to impose a
“deliberate institutional ambiguity”27 when crafting
the laws. If this ambiguity is combined with the
inconsistent enforcement of the laws which clearly
delineate land ownership and land rights, the
government has more room to adapt their policy to
meet their own needs. The phrase “collective
ownership” is deliberately left out of many places
in the land laws in order to avoid public unrest
when the land is used for the purposes of the state.28
This concept of state ownership of land is a
departure from the Mao-era policy of registering
land under the local production team. 29 Now many
of the land use laws state that the land belongs to
“the people” which the government interprets as
“the state” in cases like the Green Garden. This has
allowed local governments to take ownership of
what should be resident owned land and use it for
various development projects. In the case of Green
Garden, residents exposed what the local
government was attempting to do and used it as a
rallying point to turn the public against it.
Luckily for the residents, the government
backed down at the end of the second case and the
construction was halted. This clearly might not
happen in other cases even when residents use
similar strategy to Shen’s. What happens when the
local government is less sympathetic or the central
government is involved? As we saw with Green
Garden, there was a more radical wing that had a
desire for more extreme action which Shen had to
temper in order to achieve his goals. That radical
side can easily be the one calling the shots in an
alternate scenario. The intentional ambiguity of
China’s land laws can be “potentially explosive
source for future social conflict.”30 It is up to the
Chinese government to make sure that the rule of
law is more effectively enforced at the local levels.
They also need to clarify their land laws so that
ownership is more clearly defined and these

the party officials in the local government can
simply put pressure on the civil service bureaucracy
to issue them a building permit. Not only does this
undermine the goals of the regulations, but it also
leads to dissatisfaction among residents, many of
which might not be as well organized as Shen to
fight this. This dissatisfaction was prevalent during
the Cultural Revolution due to the arbitrariness of
regulations which resulted in many post-Mao legal
reforms to encourage consistent application of the
law. 23 These reforms have gone far to ensure much
consistency at the national and regional levels, but
not at the local levels where they are harder to
enforce due to a lack of oversight.24
What the CCP should focus on is separating
the party from government in order to ensure the
neutrality of China’s civil service. Since Wei’s 5th
criteria for effective rule of law, freedom of speech
and to a larger extent, democratic accountability, is
currently out of the question, neutrality remains a
realistic near-term possibility. This isn’t such a
radical proposal since “the party has announced as
far back as 1978 11th party congress that they
intended to separate the party from government.”25
The party would still be able to maintain ultimate
control since they would still write all of the
regulations in the first place. This would mean that
departments like the Urban Planning Bureau would
enforce regulations to the letter no matter who is
involved. Both bureaus involved in the first Green
Garden case had to try to interpret the wishes of the
vice-mayor when he said the situation should be
handled “according to the law.” Under a neutral
civil service, there would be less second guessing
and tiptoeing around officials for fear of retribution.
If the Chinese government wants more consistent
adherence to regulations across the board they need
to reign in these local authorities who repeatedly
flout the rules. Not only would this consistency
promote more economic growth and foreign
investment, it would also go further in meeting the
demands of Chinese citizens. Many Chinese do not
say that they are dissatisfied with their form of
government rather they “increasingly expect the
legal system to protect their rights” according to
Chinese law. 26 The party would still be able to set
the rules of the game by making this law but as
long as the agencies and citizens play within those
rules there should be fewer issues. Despite the
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providing them legal status.”32 With all of these
barriers and regulations it is very difficult to
maintain and operate NGOs in Shanghai.
Though in this case study Shanghai is
portrayed as being environmentally irresponsible
regarding the marshlands, the municipality has
attempted to improve the environment to a limited
degree. The municipality made great strides in
improving water quality, air quality, waste disposal
and greenery since the 1990s and hopes to become
an ecological city by 2020.33 Enforcement of
environmental regulations is left to the Shanghai
Environmental Protection Bureau (SEPB). The
SEPB has the ability to compel business to follow
regulations or be fined like it has done to thousands
of entities since its creation. It uses some of this
revenue to invest in environmental protection inside
the city. In addition to this bureau the municipality
has set up an “Environmental Protection and
Ecological Construction Coordinating Committee,”
the first of its kind in all of China.34 City officials
of the highest levels sit on the committee including
the Mayor and the Vice-Mayors. This makes
implementation of the committee’s decisions fairly
efficient since government agencies know that
these decisions come directly from the top.
Shanghai has been ranked number one among all
other cities in China for its environmental
protection efforts. All of these things, though still
falling short of what is needed in order to guarantee
a safe and clean environment for Shanghai’s
residents, are still significant since they go further
than what is implemented in other areas of China.
The municipal government has made a
concentrated effort to improve the environmental
status of the city. The money used for
environmental protection can go to other places that
would promote development showing that Chinese
political interests are more complex. The fact that
the highest officials in the city have put the issue as
a fairly high priority is also significant since in this
case study it seems like the opposite is being done.
It provides a basis for advocates to negotiate with
the city for tougher environmental protection rules
since there is a clear precedent for them. Though as
seen with this case study, there are limits to how far
Shanghai goes to protect the environment.
Despite the restrictions, many NGOs as well
as many Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) exist
within Shanghai. Most of the ENGOs that do exist

conflicts do not erupt over preserving green space
which should be publically owned. We have seen
the bounds in this scenario for how far the
government let the protesters proceed. The
protesters operation within the laws and used the
laws as their justification for their actions. Even in
a society where the rule of law is weak it is hard for
the government to ignore that these laws were
clearly being broken. When the local government
failed to stop the protesters they tried to turn the
issue into a political matter. By trying to drag the
issue of what is allowed into the area of what is not
allowed, the government wanted to delegitimize the
protests but failed to cast the protests in that light.
By the end of this case study it is clear how the
government sets the political arena and how far the
people can go without retribution.
Case Study #2: Illegal NGO Activism in the
Shanghai Jiangwan Marshlands
This second case study expands its scope and
examines the Jiangwan marshlands issue at the
regional level during 2002. Shanghai one of the
largest cities in China and the world with a
population of over 17.8 million people. 31 Even
more so when compared to the rest of China,
Shanghai has gone through tremendous economic
growth transforming into an economic hub for the
rest of the country. Many politicians use municipal
office in Shanghai as a stepping stone for higher
positions within the central government based on
their performance. Criteria for these promotions
include wealth creation and economic growth so
these goals quickly became the top priority for
policymakers. Though impressive, this economic
growth leads to many negative externalities with
environmental destruction being one of the most
prominent. This has led to the creation of many
advocacy organizations throughout the city
designed to address environmental and other
concerns. In 1999 the very well-financed Shanghai
Bureau of Civil Organizations was created as an
extension of the Shanghai Bureau of Civil Affairs.
This Bureau is charged with identifying and
suppressing (if need be) those organizations and
individuals who might challenge the aims of the
government. If a civil society organization wants to
be recognized, then they have to apply to the
bureau for approval before it can exist legally. The
government uses this ability as a tool since they can
“prevent the development of NGOs by not
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city’s birds.37 Due to the area’s large size (about
1% of the city’s area) and location within Shanghai,
the municipal government wanted to transform it
into a residential community. Considering its
importance for the city’s wildlife, especially its bird
population, WWF Shanghai took the leadership in
trying to stop this development from occurring.
The activists encountered many barriers to
effectively reach out to others outside their
organization for support. The first was to assemble
a report on the environmental impact of destroying
the marshlands. Very few scientists wished to put
their name on anything which would indicate that
they cooperated with an illegal organization. 38
Eventually, WWF Shanghai was able to get one of
its own activists with a scientific background to
write one. The NGO attempted to reach out to other
organizations like the Grassroots Community as
well as various student groups which were met with
failure. Many of these groups thought their legal
status would be threatened if they cooperated with
an illegal group. Others were instructed by the
municipal government specifically to take no action
on this issue. The only groups who were willing to
participate were those other web based groups like
Shanghai Nomad Cub and the Common Wealth
Management Project.39
WWF Shanghai and their partners attempted
to use mass media to attract attention to their fight
to protect marshlands. They attempted to contact
journalists but the municipal government put
pressure on the news agencies leading to only a few
stories to be produced on the issue. Eventually the
media stopped reporting on their situation all
together. The only other option for these groups
was to use the internet in order to raise awareness.
This strategy that WWF Shanghai was forced to use
was actually fairly effective at getting their
message out since a large number of Shanghai
residents had access to the internet.40 They used
the forums on their partner groups like the Nomad
Club and Common Wealth to report on the
destruction. The amount of visitors being routed to
the WWF Shanghai website kept rising so
dramatically that the government had to shut down
the website all together. Though the damage was
done and public opinion had already started to turn
against the government.

are permitted to do so because they do not pose a
threat to the government. The ENGO that we are
specifically studying in this case is the World
Wildlife Fund (WWF) Shanghai. Globally, WWF
has many networks of supporters in many different
countries and regional branches. Its main goals are
the restoration and, as it is in this case, conservation
of wildlife and green space. In China there are
several regional organizations with WWF China
based in Beijing. Most of the regional and local
branches of WWF China operate independently
from each other which are largely due to the nature
of China’s government system. The NGOs that
operate do so at the good graces of the CCP which
would try to thwart any large, centralized national
NGO network. This forces NGOs to operate in the
decentralized, autonomous way that WWF China
operates. WWF Shanghai has around 1000
members listed but really has only a few dozen who
are active.35 At the time of the Jiangwan incident
they had not registered officially as a legal NGO so
their current status was an illegal organization.
Their activities are actually fairly limited to
meeting together and bird watching at various
places outside and around Shanghai and not the
activism one would expect from such an so that’s
why they decided not to register.36 Members mostly
communicate on the WWF Shanghai’s website to
organize meetings and expeditions. By its nature,
this ENGO is fairly unorganized in its internal
structure. Again this is a product of the illegal
nature of this organization, by organizing the
internal structure of the ENGO it would risk the
government attempting to clamp down on it. It has
also prevented WWF Shanghai from increasing its
links with other NGOs in the area to coordinate
activities.
The Jiangwan marshlands were originally
inhabited by an airport built for the Chinese
military before occupying its role as an important
green space in Shanghai. After many years of
municipal growth for Shanghai and with the
construction of other airbases, the airport became
strategically irrelevant. During the 1970s, the area
was turned into a marshland and control was given
to the Shanghai municipal government. Due to the
lack of human disturbance, the area was
transformed into a haven for the city’s wildlife.
There are a large amount of flora and fauna that
live there and it is a breeding ground for 90% of the
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Because of the notoriety of the Jiangwan
Marshland campaign after several months of online
campaigning, more of Shanghai’s citizens started to
become involved in the project. Many different
environmental experts were organized to offer their
opinions on destruction of the marshlands at a level
that was not possible before. An online petition
against the construction was started and got the
signatures from over 1000 people.41 It wasn’t long
before several members of the Shanghai Municipal
People’s Congress began to support the activist’s
aims. They thought that perhaps it was a good idea
to possibly consider making Jiangwan a nature
preserve. When the SMPC met for the next time all
construction was stopped on the marshland. This
was significant because “for the first time, the
public, led by activists, scholars, and political
representatives, had successfully influenced
government policy.” The public was able to lead to
an outcome that wouldn’t have happened through
“institutionalized policy channels.”42
Despite the initial victory, there were still
elements within the Shanghai municipal
government who wished to develop the marshlands.
First, the government targeted the scientists who
supported the movement and were able to make
them back down by pressuring them through their
universities. The media was also more closely
scrutinized to make sure that there was no more
mention of the activists work. As the influence of
the movement started to fade, the government
conducted their own surveys to test public support
over the marshland construction. They were able to
produce an opinion outcome that was favorable for
construction on the marshlands. This was done after
a large public relations push on the side of the
government who issued articles and news reports
favorable to the construction in the media.
Eventually, the government issued a new
development plan for the marshlands which only
preserved 200 square meters. WWF Shanghai was
not able to meet its goals or objectives at preserving
this critical green space within Shanghai.

see operate. The existing NGOs are essentially
beholden not to its members but rather to the
government itself. “The Party monopolizes the
legitimate channels of interest articulation and
aggregation”43 so their message has to agree with
the party’s. Since they decide if an organization is
recognized or unrecognized, the organizations have
a very limited arena where they can operate. If their
issue is too controversial or political in nature then
they will get shut down. NGOs literally have to live
in a state of fear because any misstep might lead
them to be de-recognized. This is why they were so
averse to assisting WWF Shanghai since the
government might act against them. De-recognition
would mean that they would not be able to grow
too large, advertise extensively, advocate for too
many issues, or have many activities. Essentially,
they would have to operate as a small,
decentralized, and unorganized group much like
WWF Shanghai did before they advocated for the
Jiangwan marshlands. These NGOs “lack the
organizational capacity to implement even
medium-scale projects on their own.”44 They have
to reach out and collaborate with others which is
difficult if you are unrecognized because of the
stigma attached to it. As an alternative, the
government often times tries to set up NGOs which
have its leaders on the government payroll. They
use the excuse that they want to eliminate
“unproductive competition” between NGOs when
what they really want to do is achieve control.45
Just like business, the government wants to be able
to control all areas of society in China so the most
favorable outcome for the CCP is assured. One
would ask why the government spends so much
time suppressing organizations that are of a nonpolitical nature. It is because these organizations
“enhance individuals’ capacity for collective
political action.”46 They enable individuals to
advocate for non-political issues which give them
this experience for pushing for government change.
By having all of these organizations providing this
advocacy training to its population, in the future it
can be directed towards political issues like voting
and civil rights. Since political mobilization is one
of the CCP’s major fears, it is only natural that they
clamp down on these NGOs.

Analysis and Policy Prescriptions
The PRC uses the system of NGO regulation
as a way to control civil society within its borders.
The process of recognition for NGOs is essential
for this control to be effective since the government
can basically decide which organizations it wants to
41
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Another interesting phenomenon that this case
study exposes was the use of the media and the
internet to mobilize opposition to the project. Since
the structure of WWF Shanghai is very loose and
decentralized, the internet gave it the perfect
medium to communicate with supporters. It was
able to organize meetings of people to discuss the
issue and come to a consensus on a plan of action.
More importantly, it provided a medium of
communication that was an alternative to the state
run media. When the opposition to the marshlands
got too threatening to the municipal government’s
plans, they ordered the media to stop reporting on
it. This meant that the group’s website and its
partner’s websites were the only way to inform the
public about the marshland issue. With the media
reports being skewed by the government the
internet posed a contradiction to the official
account of what was going on. The members of
WWF Shanghai were able to, through their website,
“offer alternative perspectives on events from those
provided by other media.”47 Since most Chinese
citizens are aware of the government’s role in the
press, they might be more inclined to believe what
they see on the web from independent sources.
Suddenly, the PRC’s stranglehold on the media and
official communication is loosened by the internet.
WWF Shanghai even got a petition signed by over
1000 Shanghai residents which assisted in getting a
temporary halt on the project. As was seen with the
first case study, petitions are an effective and
mostly legal tool for citizens to register their
discontent. But why is the CCP so afraid of this
activity which ultimately made them close down
the website? It is what Howard Rheingold describes
as the internet’s “democratizing potential.”48 This
potential comes from where the fast transfer of
information between millions of individuals can
lead to. If citizens can communicate
instantaneously and organize themselves to
advocate for environmental issues, why not for
democratic rights as well? It is the same dilemma
as the NGOs pose; their work and experience given
onto citizens for non-political issues can easily be
turned onto political issues. The internet threatens
to “transform their more traditional forms of
political behavior” into that which can directly
oppose the government.49 With the rising amount of
Chinese citizens who have access to the internet
this can be extremely dangerous for the regime.

Shanghai is a perfect example of this potential since
it has a very large internet savvy population.
This case study shows that even within a
certain level of government in the PRC, there are a
variety of interests and actions at work at one time.
Certain members of the SMPC were sympathetic to
the people’s cause of protecting the marshlands.
WWF Shanghai’s petitions and scientific studies
were able to convince the Congress that the
marshlands needed more examination before it was
built on. Though the council was able to effectively
stop the construction, there were other interests in
the mayor’s office, the city planning board and
other municipal institutions which wanted to see it
continue. The higher officials in the government,
by the system’s nature, are more worried about
developing the area and advancing their economic
goals so they can get posted to higher positions by
the central CCP. This shows that even in a city
where the environment does place as a high
priority, development still wins. It is economic
progress that ultimately gets one promoted, not
progress on protecting the environment. Because
the interests of the different levels of the municipal
government diverge with the more powerful ones in
favor of development, ultimately the builders won.
The PRC needs to ease its restrictions on NGO
registration and development in order to properly
address the environmental concerns of its citizens.
In a state such as China, there is no democratic
citizen-government feedback loop for people to air
their grievances and express their concerns. NGOs
provide an alternative to that loop by providing a
collective voice for issues of the population. By
cutting that alternative out of the picture, citizens
lack a mechanism to register their disagreements
with government policy and mismanagement which
could become a potentially explosive issue. By
keeping the cap on civil society, China’s goal of
political stability could be undermined as
environmental problems get even worse and
increasingly dissatisfied people have no outlet for
their concerns. The government has “limited
NGO’s usefulness as champions of interests and
values different from that of the government.”50 By
restricting NGOs, the PRC misses an opportunity to
use them for their non-advocacy benefits as well.
Plenty of NGOs do work in environmental cleanup,
conservation activities, and environmental
management which would go a long way to helping
China cope with its environmental issues. Without
the opening up of the registration system there will
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be few national networks of NGOs and little
cooperation between them. This is required for any
healthy society to flourish as China becomes more
urbanized and its citizens look for these
organizations to fill certain gaps.
At first, WWF Shanghai as an illegal NGO
was able to work around many barriers that the
government imposed with registration like
cooperation with others, media and the internet. But
in the end the government was able to halt its
activities by cutting off its institutional links and
outlets for organization. At this point in China, it
would be extremely difficult for illegal NGOs to
succeed in advocacy efforts because of the
government can easily stop them from operating.
The internet became a useful tool for WWF
Shanghai in mobilizing supporters and spreading
their message. It is difficult for the government to
keep track of all traffic on the web which allowed
even an illegal NGO to succeed for so long. The
fact that they almost succeeded in getting the
project completely stopped could provide a strategy
for other illegal NGOs to use. Certainly for a legal
NGO these benefits would accrue quicker with an
established network of supporters and more range
to operate due to its status. Despite WWF
Shanghai’s limited success, it ultimate failed
because of their lack of recognition and the benefits
afforded from that. In order for the NGO society to
operate effectively and accurately reflect the
people’s interests, China will have to deregulate its
NGO sector and allow for freer access to the
internet.

Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) which
are issued before building on projects commences.
Part of this reason was an effort by the MEP to
achieve more influence on the EIA process where it
is often eclipsed by other economically oriented
ministries.52 After 56 ENGO’s issued a letter in
2005 which supported the MEP’s growing
influence on the EIA process, an informal
partnership was established between these two
groups. This ultimately led to the establishment of
the regulation “Provisional Measures for Public
Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment”
in 2006 which was the “first legal document that
enables the participation of the public in
environmental policy-making process.”53
A large number of public ENGOs exist in
Beijing and foster a community of organizations
which are able to advocate for their interests. They
have their roots in the 1990’s with the
establishment of the first ENGO, Friends of Nature,
in 1993. An offshoot of that NGO, the Green
Environmental Volunteers (GEV), is the ENGO
that we will be studying in this case study. After the
turn of the century the amount of ENGOs increased
dramatically after feeding off of existing
organizations and enjoying increasing support from
the MEP. Student green organizations also become
prominent which fed into larger organizations after
graduation. ENGOs in Beijing have had a large
degree of cooperation by “sharing information,
organizing workshops, launching programs
collectively to achieve stronger influence” etc.54
The GEV in particular was one of the most
prominent ENGOs in Beijing. They had almost 200
permanent members with a volunteer and advocacy
network of over 30,000 people. 55 It is well
connected and has led a number of campaigns with
other NGOs before. Despite its loose organizational
structure, its leadership of extremely motivated
individuals enables it to be successful.
The GEV took a leadership role in opposing
the decision to build a large scale damming project
on the Nu River. The Nu river flows through
Yunnan province into Myanmar and is one of the
last large rivers to not to be dammed in China.
Surrounding it is a natural World Heritage Site
where much of China’s biodiversity lies with 79
rare or endangered species making their home

Case Study #3: Environmental Activism from
Beijing to the Nu River
Beijing, like Shanghai and many other cities in
China has experienced extremely fast growth over
the past couple decades. Also like many other
Chinese cities, it has a very poor environmental
protection record with serious air and water
pollution problems.51 It wasn’t until the 2000s
when Beijing sought to improve its pollution
problem culminating in a fierce campaign right
before the 2008 Olympic Games. Unlike in other
regions, Beijing has been fairly tolerant of ENGOs
operating within the city. The Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MEP) has openly
declared their support for many such institutions
and has even cooperated with them in the past. It
has even included their participation in
51
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there.56 The project entailed building 13 hydroelection power stations at various points on the
river generating 3.64 million kilowatts which is
more than ever the Three Gorges Dam.57 Due to the
environmental impact of the dam, which would
disturb much of the wildlife and plant species in the
area, there was quite a lot of opposition to the
project. The MEP and a group of ENGOs were
opposed to the project and tried to organize
meetings and make the public aware of the
downsides of this project. The National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
was on the other side of the issue claiming that the
benefits of this badly needed power generation
outweigh the downsides. The controversy over the
project was able to push the projected start date
past 2003 giving the ENGOs a chance to step up
their campaign against the dams.
NGO partnerships between the GEV and local
Yunnan organizations were crucial in opposing the
dam project. In Kunming, the capital of Yunnan,
the ENGO Green Watershed was the primary
organization in opposition to the project. Support
locally was weak for Green Watershed because the
provincial government cracked down on potential
partnerships by restricting media reporting as well
as by other means. Upon interviewing leaders of
other NGOs, it was discovered that their lack of
participation was due to concerns over their status
which could be under threat if the oppose the
government.58 Due to this lack of support, Green
Watershed was forced to turn to GEV, a Beijing
based NGO in the hope of assistance. GEV was
very willing to assist in advocating against such a
potentially damaging project and was able to get
several of its partners involved in the fight. Because
restrictions on the ENGO culture in Beijing were
relatively loose, many of the leaders of the different
organizations in the city had very developed
guanxi, or influential networks of influence. 59 In
addition to the NGO sector, GEV’s leaders were
able to use their guanxi with the MEP to coordinate
action.
Once these partnerships were made between
regional and Beijing NGOs they started to act to
preserve the watershed. The MEP attempted to get
a serious EIA of the project but it was stonewalled
by supporters within the government. Many in the
MEP increasingly turned toward the ENGO sector

by providing them with updates and information in
order to help them advocate strongly for the area’s
preservation in ways that they could not.60 The
GEV was then able to use this information to report
this issue in the media and get scientists to support
their environmental claims. Through both
organizations, scientists in both Beijing, and locally
in Yunnan were contacted to offer their opinion
through both on the ground assessments and
reports. The MEP could then turn around and say
the original EIA of the site was biased because of
the clear opposition of all these scientists without
seeming like it was instigating a coalition against
the government. The media was also able to publish
many of these opinions in both public newspapers
and, most significantly, the daily newspaper for the
CCP. This newspaper had a real significant impact
on policy makers which was a major achievement
for the movement since their goal was not only to
reach a public consensus against the building but
that of the government as well. Eventually the GEV
organized a trip for journalists to the area where
they got to see the environmental as well as social
impact of the project. It was a big concern that over
50,000 people would have to be moved from their
homes as a result of the dams.61 The more media
coverage the issue got the more support from the
public, government, and other ENGOS the antibuilding side received.
As public support continued to rise against the
dam building, the actions of the ENGO coalition
intensified in 2004. They conducted a series of
photo exhibitions at several universities, in a
supermarket, post office, and an office building
showing the Nu river watershed. They even created
a website called “Nu River Sentiment” where
people could pledge their support for the region’s
preservation. 62 More scientific studies were
published and presented at conferences nationally
and internationally. The coalition even got
international support from NGOs further downriver
from the dams. 80 NGOs in Thailand and Laos
wrote letters protesting the project and sent them to
the Chinese embassy in Thailand.63 In the end, due
to a combination of pressures, the government
continued to push off the project with no definite
start date for construction at present time.
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often overlapped. Since environmental protection
was acceptable to the central government up until a
point, these NGOs were permitted to operate
extensively.
The establishment of the Ministry of
Environmental Protection is a step in the right
direct yet shows some unsettling aspects of Chinese
environmental policy. The Ministry was a relatively
new creation when it was created as the State
Environmental Protection Administration in 1998
when environmental protection in China became a
larger priority.65 As seen in this case study, it began
to partner up with NGOs in the early to mid-2000s
to help advance its goals. Part of the reason that this
cooperation with civil society was needed was
because it “lacks the money, staff, and power to
override local leaders and to shut down polluters.”66
Unable to achieve its goals itself because of the
lack of resources, it had to turn to these sectors. The
information that it provided to GEV was crucial in
allowing scientists to compile reports claiming the
marshland construction was damaging. In giving
them support, the MEP was able to use the GEV to
force the opinion of the public against the opinion
of more powerful ministries like the NDRC.
Elevating environmental protection to ministry
level should not give the impression that it has
achieved the same priority level as the NDRC
which has equal status. The MEV is handicapped at
the start because “environmental protection often
loses to the more attractive goal of economic
development.”67 With economic growth still
remaining the top priority for the government,
ministries like the NDRC will always have more
resources and capabilities than the MEV. In a way
this will continue to strengthen the NGO
community since the state will have to continue to
turn to “non -state actors to carry some of the
environmental protection burden.”68 Because of this
increasing role of ENGOs in environmental
protection, it leads to new regulations passed to
legitimize public participation in EIAs. The MEP’s
support of the ENGO community has been essential
to its growth and to its protections efforts.
This Nu River damming issue exposes the
stark difference between different agencies within
the central government. The MEP has shown a

Analysis and Policy Prescriptions
The success of the Green Environmental
Volunteers was significant in both the size and
scope of the Nu River dam project. The GEV was a
legal NGO so therefore it had more room to operate
than the illegal NGO we saw in the first case study,
WWF Shanghai. The advantages afforded to it
because of its status were obvious. It was allowed
to use the internet and reach out to the public
without being clamped down upon. Organizations
were able to partner up with it without fear of
reprisals from the government. It was even allowed
to cooperate with the Environmental Protection
Ministry which would have been forbidden if the
GEV was an illegal group. Without these benefits
the campaign probably would not have been able to
attract as much public attention. The media was
allowed to report on the issue as much as it wanted
as long as it didn’t openly challenge the
government. Journalists were not as afraid as
approaching the NGO and the government did not
stop news stories from being published.
The GEV was permitted to operate as it did
partially because of the lack of crackdown from the
Beijing government. Even though it had legal
status, the government might have been able to try
to shut it down by other means but it didn’t. The Nu
river dam project was of the utmost national
significance and posed an opportunity to greatly
increase China’s power generation capacity. The
potential of this project was more than that of the
Three Gorges Dam, arguably China’s most
important infrastructure project. Part of the reason
that this crackdown didn’t happen was because of
the central government’s new priorities for
environmental protection. It was discovered that
“environmental pollution cost China 511.8 billion
Yuan (USD64 billion) in economic losses,
accounting for 3.05 per cent of the country's GDP
in 2004.”64 This only quantifies what China has
known for years which were that these problems
were hurting China’s economic growth and the
problem was getting worse. If China was to
maintain its high growth levels it had to deal with
these problems. It also had to tackle many of its
problems due to its expected accession to the WTO
and in preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games.
Because these organizations were located within
Beijing, central government and the city’s policies
64
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remarkable amount of independence from the goals
of economic policy planners within the PRC. It has
been able to raise environmental concerns up to a
point where their opinion is recognized as a
legitimate consideration in the construction process.
Much of the time this opinion is ignored but it is
still significant progress since it is the starting point
for further advancements. There is still a long way
to go before it reaches the power levels of the
NDRC who was starkly opposed to the project. The
bureaucratic power struggle between the two
ministries shows that the supposedly monolithic
power structure of the Chinese government is not
even true at the central level. Both agencies were
ultimately engaged in a fight to convince policy
makers that their position is the most legitimate. In
this case, because public opinion was so strong
because of the environmental damage, the
“ecological impact” vs. “growth of the local
economy and the increase in national energy”
argument landed on the side of the environment.69
Unfortunately this is a rarity because more often the
side of the NDRC wins out making this victory
more significant.
The PRC needs to strengthen its institutional
capacity for environmental enforcement in order for
the environment to be properly protected. The
creation of the ministry is significant, but it still
does not mean that its goals will be met. The
government needs to give the MEP the capabilities
to enforce environmental regulations and review
projects more closely. This will not happen unless a
number of changes happen to the ministry,
including raising the numbers of employment from
its current number which is one-eighth the size of
the US Environmental Protection Agency.70
Previously it was mentioned that this lack of
support has strengthened the ENGO community by
forcing the MEP to turn to them for assistance but a
strengthening would also help the community. By
giving the MEP the resources to accomplish its
mission, it would strengthen the causes of these
ENGOs by giving their positions more legitimacy
from a branch of the government. The relationship
between the ENGOs and MEP has already been
established so it would be unlikely that it would be
diminished just because one side’s power
capabilities have been enhanced especially since
they would be working in tandem. ENGOs need to
continue to exploit the differences between
branches of the government to help them succeed.
69
70

By combining this with favorable public opinion
for preserving the Nu River watershed, the GEV
was able to preserve the region for the time being.
Conclusion
The three case studies in this paper reveal
several interesting developments in how the
government and NGOs interact in the realm of the
environment. One of the most significant is haw
different levels of government as well as different
institutions inside those levels have such a variety
of interests and methods for dealing with
environmental activism. In our first case study we
see a lower level of government (local) ignoring the
regulations of the higher level of government
(municipal) in order to build on park lands. The
local level of government was able to influence the
bureaucracy enough that they were willing to
ignore the regulations as well. One would expect
that rules coming from a higher level of
government to a lower level of government in an
authoritarian, one-party state to be followed no
matter what but that are clearly not the case.
Among other factors, once the higher levels of
government was informed about this lack of
adherence they put pressure on the local
government to shut the project down. In the second
case study at the municipal level of Shanghai there
was a stark difference not between levels of
government but among the same level of
government. The Shanghai Municipal People’s
Congress actually was able to delay the project for
a time. They thought the project should be
reevaluated before construction proceeded against
the wishes of the higher officials within the city
government. Ultimately the wishes of these higher
officials were able to win out since the process
went along. In the last case study there was a
difference between two branches of the central
government between the Ministry of Environmental
Protection and the National Development and
Reform Commission. The MEP wanted the Nu
River project stopped and the NDRC wanted it to
continue with both ministries trying to influence
policy makers. These branches of the bureaucracy
were literally competing for influence in order to
advance their respective goals. Though the Chinese
government operates in a one-party state the
interests of the top do not necessarily lead to the
desired outcomes at the bottom. This is because as
we have seen with the case studies, every branch
and level of government has goals and interests that
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they try to serve and they vary enough that
differing outcomes will manifest.
Activists have tried a number of strategies to
overcome barriers that the PRC has placed to block
their activism. Shen, an individual in the first case
study was able to motivate his neighbors to activate
for a purely local concern. He was able to use the
actual laws of the state which forbade construction
to validate his position. This made it difficult for
government officials to argue with him or shut his
protests down because they were using actual laws
of the state to “authenticate” his position. He
framed their protests as simply protecting the
resident’s environmental rights which was
extremely effective. When their interests were
ignored, on two separate occasions Shen ordered
that the protesters take down first the wall, and then
the scaffolding at the site in an orderly manner. It
was important that they did not destroy anything
and that they did this on the basis of the law
because if not, this protest would not have been
tolerated. He was able to make the government
afraid of their potential violence but not of any
outward real violence which would have gotten
them imprisoned. In Beijing, legal NGOs like the
Green Environmental Volunteers had more leeway
to operate. They were able to form direct
partnerships with the MEP which was a district
branch of the government. The MEP was even able
to send it information regarding the project
enabling them to have scientists rally against the
Nu River damn. Though rare, these partnerships
with supporters in government are essential for
NGOs to exploit. Since they are legitimate voices
in policy making circles, they are able to influence
decisions. In the case of Beijing, the MEP had
enough strength to make a difference in that
advocacy situation. The GEV was able to raise
public opinion through the media and the internet
and let the public know how destructive the project
would be. Because the MEP coupled with NGOs
who were able to get public opinion on their side,
this greatly enhanced their power so that they could
compete with the more powerful ministries like the
NDRC. Another advantage that the GEV had in this
situation was the ability to form connections with
other NGOs. Since the zeal for environmental
protection was so high at the time and Beijing was
going through a period of relative loosening, this
was possible. The GEV was able to use other
Beijing NGOs to assist them at building public
opinion through their guanxi, or personal
connections. They were even able to assist local
NGOs who exist in more unfavorable climates to

advocate for the construction to not proceed.
Forming these networks of cooperation is necessary
for effective national opposition to environmental
projects to succeed.
While there were many strategies that were
effective at advancing the environmentalist’s goals
there were also many others that were met with
mixed results. The efforts of WWF Shanghai were
the most prevalent in this case. They were an illegal
NGO that never applied for recognition because
they never needed to. When the issue for the
protection of the Jiangwan marshlands became
apparent, they attempted to advocate for its
protection but instead were met with a clampdown
from the government. They did attempt to use the
media and the internet as tools for promoting their
issues. Shanghai as well as many other parts of
China is increasingly connected to the internet
giving them access to more information. Because of
this, WWF Shanghai, an illegal NGO was able to
be successful for a short time even after the
government stopped media reporting on the issue.
They could organize meetings to come to a
scientific consensus and also get petitions signed by
other citizens. Their online efforts were almost
effective when the SMPC ordered a stop on their
construction efforts. At the same time the internet
offers many advantages for the green movement, it
also gives them several vulnerabilities. The
government was able to shut down WWF
Shanghai’s internet outlet and succeed at getting
their project built because public opinion started to
fade. With the GEV environmental activism online
was permitted because they were a legal NGO but
that is not always guaranteed to be the case if the
government feels threatened. Nevertheless, the use
of the internet is an effective tool for both illegal
and legal NGOs. Ultimately if NGOs want to
succeed at their activism in the long term, they will
need this legal status to function effectively. The
politicization of environmental concerns was also a
big issue as was seen in the first case study. The
government tried to drag the activism into the
political realm as Shen tried to keep it nonpolitical.
They almost succeeded at stopping his movement
but because of Shen’s persistence at keeping the
issue centered on the environment, they were able
to succeed. For the time being activists will have to
make sure that their activism is kept in this nonpolitical realm until there is a widespread political
change within the PRC.
The PRC needs to embrace a number of
reforms in order for it to better cope with
environmental activism. Firstly, it needs to ensure a
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greater rule of law within the bureaucracy and
government. Regulations should be followed no
matter what politicians and party members try to
say to influence it. This is the only way that
environmental regulations will be ensured to be
effective at all levels and not be controlled by
special interests. This move towards greater rule of
law has other benefits for the PRC like greater
efficiency and it seems that it is moving generally
in that direction. The party would still ultimately be
able to write what regulations which would be
followed so nothing to far outside their interests
would be done. The PRC also needs to lift the
restrictions that it places on NGO registration in
order for civil society to flourish and the interests
of the people be properly reflected. Understandably
these NGOs represent a threat to the regime since
they give them activist training. But, in order to
assist the state in identifying polluters and without
the collaboration from NGOs to protect China’s
environment, the state’s environmental needs will
be difficult to meet. The government also needs to
strengthen the MEP to make it able to compete with
other ministries. Of course, economic interests will
trump environmental ones for a long time. More
money, resources and staff will still go far in
ensuring that the MEP has more of an ability to
articulate its interests. Many of these reforms would
be beneficial, but China is only likely to implement
them in a limited manner in the short term.
Ultimately what is necessary for China to have
truly effective environmental activism would be an
open political system and competitive democracy.
Since this will not happen anytime soon, China
needs to implement several of these reforms in
order to effectively deal with environmental
concerns of its citizens. Like mentioned before,
environmental problems have explosive potential if
they continue to deteriorate which represent
“destabilizing factors” for the government. This is
why the PRC has decided to take up environmental
protection as one of its top concerns. Though
commendable, they have not gone far enough in
ensuring this protection leading to so much
activism. These activists have met much resistance
and encountered many failures but at the same time
many successes as well. Jonathan Schwartz writes
that “China's environmental non-governmental
organization community-arguably the most
advanced manifestation of Chinese civil society.”
In this role, environmental activists have the
potential to define how civil society as a whole
grows and changes in China into the future.
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